This paper o¤ers a dynamic model of the foreign exchange market where some investors in the market are more informed than others. By adjusting the proportion of informed investors in the market, it is shown that the disconnect between macroeconomic variables and the exchange rate is sensitive to the amount of asymmetric information in the market. A surprising …nding is that this disconnect is bigger when the proportion of informed investors in the market is smaller.
Introduction
The disconnect between macroeconomic fundamentals and the exchange rate has been wellestablished in the exchange rate literature. A notable demonstration of this disconnect by Flood and Rose (1995) shows that volatility of variables such as money and output does not appear to be signi…cantly di¤erent during regimes of …xed and ‡oating exchange rates. A theoretical explanation for this disconnect has been o¤ered by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) and they demonstrate how information dispersion can cause rational confusion among investors, which then magni…es the disconnect between macroeconomic fundamentals and the exchange rate.
In this short paper, I build upon the explanation by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) and show that the disconnect between macroeconomic variables and the exchange rate is sensitive to the amount of asymmetric information in the market. By controlling the proportion of investors who receive noisy private signals about future macroeconomic fundamentals on top of the public signals that all investors receive, I can adjust the level of information dispersion in the model. This additional control allows me to demonstrate that the response, as well as persistence, of equilibrium exchange rate to fundamental and non-fundamental shocks is quite di¤erent for varying levels of asymmetric information in the market. The …ndings also suggest that strengthening the connection between macroeconomic fundamentals and the exchange rate might be possible by increasing the proportion of investors holding more information in the market.
Recently, with the availability of customer order ‡ow data, many researchers have shown that the impact of order ‡ow on the equilibrium exchange rate depends on the type of customers initiating the order 1 . These …ndings, coupled with the …nding that dealers o¤er smaller spreads to informed customers as shown in Osler, et al. (2010) , suggest that di¤ering levels of impact of customer orders on the equilibrium exchange rate might be due to di¤erent levels of information they possess. This empirical …nding is represented in the model of this paper through 1) the noisy public signal every investor receives and 2) the noisy private signal only a proportion of investors receive. The idea to control for the proportion of investors receiving the private signal is motivated by an interesting paper by Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) , where for di¤erent currency pairs, they measure the probability of a dealer trading with an informed investor who might have more information about the future of the exchange rate than dealers do. Authors o¤er a measure called PIN (probability of informed trading) for six di¤erent currency pairs and for four di¤erent customer categories and …nd that the probability of a dealer trading with an informed investor can be as low as 10 percent for certain currency and customer groups, whereas as high as over 60 percent for others. Even within the same customer groups, they report a gap of almost 20
percentage points from one currency pair to another. These …ndings are good indication that a theoretical model that allows for varying levels of asymmetric information in the market is 
Theoretical Model
The setup of the model follows from Onur (2008) . It is a two-country monetary model of exchange rate determination with money market equilibrium, purchasing power parity and interest rate parity assumed.
There is a continuum of investors in both countries and they are distributed on the [0; 1]
interval. I assume a myopic agent setup where agents live for two periods and make only one investment decision. Investors are identical in the sense that they have the same utility function and they know that exchange rate depends on the expectations of future fundamentals. Investors in both countries can invest in money of their own country, bonds of the home country for a return of i t , bonds of the foreign country for a return of i t , and in some type of production with a …xed return. This production is assumed to depend on the exchange rate as well as on real money holdings of investor i, i t . Thus, the production function is written as f ( Investor i will want to hedge himself, and this hedge against non-asset income will add to the demand in the foreign exchange market. An investor's hedge demand changes every period and it is known by the investor himself only.
Investor i maximizes his expected discounted future utility conditional on information known at t, F i t , and his budget constraint. The maximization problem can be written as
subject to c i t+1
where w i t is wealth at the start of period t, B i t is the amount invested in foreign bonds, and s t+1 s t + i t i t is the log-linearized excess return on investing in foreign bonds. Investor i chooses the optimal amount of foreign bonds to hold and the …rst order condition becomes 
where the fundamentals are de…ned as f t = (m t m t ) 2 .
Investor i's foreign bond demand can be written as
Hedging demand emerging from the exchange rate exposure variable is assumed to be composed of an average term and an idiosyncratic term, b
The average hedging demand is unobservable to any of the investors but they know the autoregressive process it follows,
Applying this market equilibrium condition to (3) yields
Information Structure
As well as observing all past and current values of fundamentals, investors also observe signals regarding future fundamentals. All investors in the market receive a noisy public signal about the future value of fundamentals. Asymmetric information arises from the fact that a proportion of investors also receive a noisy private signal about the future value of fundamentals in addition to the public signal received by every investor. I use ! to denote the proportion of investors who receive just the public signal. Throughout the paper, I choose to call them "uninformed" investors for tractability reasons. The remaining proportion of investors, 1 !, are classi…ed as "informed"investors. Note that changing the ratio of informed investors to uninformed investors in the economy is equivalent to choosing how much private information exists in the market 3 .
I Assume that the fundamentals in the economy are governed by the process
where
I also assume the noisy public signal received by all investors to be denoted by z t and the noisy private signal received by informed investor i to be denoted by i t . These signals carry information about the value of the fundamental T periods ahead, f t+T . In the economy, let the noisy public signal be structured in the following manner:
The public signal is composed of two components, the actual value of future fundamentals and a persistent term, w z t . I assume that this persistent term follows an autoregressive process with z < 1. 4 The error term, " z t , is independent from the value of future fundamentals and it is unknown to investors at time t. In this setup, public signal does not reveal the exact value of future fundamentals to the investors. On the other hand, the structure of the noisy private signal is:
where error term of the signal being independent from u t and other investors'signals. Due to the law of large numbers, I assume the average signal received by informed investors to be u t ,
The Equilibrium Exchange Rate
I adopt a solution method suggested by Townsend (1983) and successfully applied to an exchange rate model by Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006) . The solution method realizes that the equilibrium exchange rate and its components can be represented by a combination of current and past shocks to the economy.
where L is the lag operator, equation (5) can be represented in terms of current and past innovations. The next step is to conjecture a representation for the equilibrium exchange rate in terms of current and past innovations and 4 The fact that z t has a persistent term permits the public signal to be written in terms of its current and past innovations when conjecturing the equilibrium exchange rate.
then use the method of undetermined coe¢ cients solution technique to solve for the equilibrium values of the coe¢ cients. The conjectured exchange rate depends on shocks to observable and unobservable fundamentals:
where A(L), B(L), and C(L) are in…nite order polynomials in L. Only a portion of these innovations are unknown to the investor. At time t, investors observe today's fundamentals as well as innovations from previous periods. That means values of " f between t + 1 and t + T are unknown to the investor. Investors also do not observe the non-fundamental shocks, " b , between t and t T , as well as the public information shocks, " z , between t and t T . Non-fundamental and public shocks before time t T are known by the investors.
Detailed solution of method of undetermined coe¢ cients involves using equation (9) and the distinct information structure of two types of investors in the market to compute E t (s t+1 ) and 2 t . Once they are written in terms of innovations, I match their coe¢ cients with the initial conjecture to …nd the equilibrium exchange rate. Note that both of the terms E t (s t+1 ) and 2 t depend on the amount of asymmetric information in the market, !.
SOLUTION TO THE MODEL
This section outlines the solution to the model. Note that in the model, the equilibrium exchange rate depends on the true value of future fundamentals T periods ahead. Accordingly, today's signals reveal the true value of fundamentals and non-fundamentals from T periods ago. As a result, expectations of future fundamentals at time t are a¤ected by signals from previous periods.
In the conjectured exchange rate in equation (9) , the exchange rate is written in terms of observed and unobserved innovations. Using the conjectured exchange rate, …rst E t (s t+1 ) and 2 are written in the same manner. Following equation (9), s t+1 is represented as s t+1 =
and following Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006) closely, the same equality can be re-written as: (10) are represented as:
Thus, the expected value of tomorrow's exchange rate is written as:
and
The next step is to estimate E i t ( t ) and var ( t ) as functions of past innovations for the two di¤erent kinds of investors in the market.
Conditional Expectations for Informed Investors
The …rst step is to create a new vector of observables that carry only the information that is new to the investor. I subtract the known components from the observables s t , Realize that the unconditional means of t and w i t are zero and let their unconditional variances be e P and R respectively 5 .
Following Townsend (1983) , the conditional expectation can be written as:
and the conditional variance of t , P var ( t ), is given by P = e P M H 0 e P .
Conditional Expectations for Less-informed Investors
Following the same steps, …rst I de…ne the new information vector. I keep the general notation the same but use a di¤erent superscript for these investors.
Let Y u t = s t ; s t 1 ; :::; s t T +1 ; z t ; z t 1 ; :::; z t T +1 be the new information vector for uninformed investors. Less-informed investors use only the public signal and the exchange rate to provide information on the vector of unobservables t . These signals are demonstrated as:
and the conditional expectation is written as:
and e P is again the unconditional variance of t . The conditional variance of t , P u var ( t ), is
given by P u = e P M u H u0 e P .
Tracing Out the Solution
First, I derive 2 by substituting var ( t ) into equation (12). The next step is to write average expectation of tomorrow's exchange rate in terms of innovations. This is done by combining equations (13) and (14) for informed investors and (15) and (16) for uninformed investors. The resulting representation becomes:
and I use the expressions of E t (s t+1 ) and 2 to solve a …xed point problem by equating these equations to the conjectured exchange rate. This yields the solutions for coe¢ cients of A(L), B(L) and C(L) polynomials 7 and hence a representation for the equilibrium exchange rate in terms of innovations. This representation allows for the impulse response functions and the analysis presented in the next section. 7 A description of the solution for the coe¢ cients can be found in appendix B. Figures 1 through 4 show the dynamic impact of one-standard-deviation shock on the exchange rate for di¤erent levels of asymmetric information in the market. The shocks are innovations to future fundamentals, innovations to aggregate hedge demand (which represent changes in nonfundamentals) and innovations to public signal. To be able to derive direct comparison with Impulse response functions also show that as ! increases, persistence of the non-fundamental shocks increases as well. This means that when only 10 percent of investors are informed, confusion due to non-fundamentals lasts the longest in the economy. As a result, that is also the case when a shock to future fundamentals take the slowest path while converging to its true level.
Analysis and Results

Impulse Response Functions
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I extend the results of Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006) by introducing a mechanism that allows the researcher to change the proportion of informed-to-uninformed investors in the market. This is achieved by allowing every investor in the model to receive a noisy public signal about future fundamentals but only a proportion of investors receiving their own noisy private signal on top the public signal they receive. The main …ndings are that as there is a higher proportion of informed investors in the market, the e¤ect of a shock to future fundamen- f-shock b-shock z-shock tals on the exchange rate is higher. Also, the e¤ect of a non-fundamental shock on the exchange rate is relatively high in the model as long as there is asymmetric information (due to rational confusion). Surprisingly, a shock to non-fundamentals has the biggest e¤ect on the exchange rate when the proportion of informed investors in the market is the smallest (10 percent). In other words, rational confusion is the biggest when the amount of aggregate information about future fundamentals in the economy is the lowest 8 .
This paper o¤ers a general model to match di¤erent foreign exchange markets with di¤erent levels of PIN measures, as presented in Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) . It also suggests that while the disconnect between macro fundamentals and the exchange rate arises from information asymmetry, the magnitude of this disconnect can di¤er from one currency market to another.
Results also show that only a small proportion of informed investors is all needed to create the disconnect in any market. In conclusion, if one wanted to strengthen the connection between exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals in any foreign exchange market, increasing the proportion of investors holding more information (maybe through information disclosure) might be a good idea.
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